















This paper considers the lack of a universal CCTV policy across the United Kingdom and Europe and how this apparent omission is being addressed in the context of increased surveillance, and the omnipresence of CCTV in particular. Special attention is paid to the role of academics within the apparently long, drawn-out process of a current move from fragmented to collective regulation. What it seems exists is individual, independent policy that implicates wider legislation. What it seems is desired is a more comprehensive and codified decree. Starting with the issues that underpin CCTV and surveillance in general, this paper acknowledges the opposing arguments that CCTV can be helpful to policing as those that demonstrate how well it can facilitate a means of social control. The paper moves to consider the possibility of a ‘surveillance policy’ applicable and effective for CCTV’s balanced regulation, and discusses the means by which this might be realised, paying special attention to who is involved and to what extent, especially where this involves academic input. Academic input to date is problematized on one hand on account of its arguably narrow scope (source/personnel) and the trends yet ostensible wavering it entails on the other. Therefore, the author’s reservations around the place of academics in the process, especially because they appear to be key to developments, whilst variously demonstrating both influential flippancy and seriousness, lead to the conclusion that there is difficulty with trying to solve the ‘problem’ with the same thinking that created it. 
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In applying for a passport, a bank account or membership of a reward scheme, one is reminded that information is being sought and provided, and that records are being kept. Thus there is awareness that data is being collected and activities or interactions are being monitored to some degree, and for a particular purpose, by the government or corporation involved, even if that is forgotten or becomes taken for granted from time to time. There are protocols to be followed (which are usually fairly openly communicated in information/terms and conditions literature, even if these are overlooked, which are usually voluntarily provided in paper or electronic formats) and the reasons for providing the information requested, and for keeping such records, are implicit because the schemes cannot operate otherwise. Moreover, one can derive the benefits of registration through tangible means (e.g. free passage/proof of identity, the convenience of using a card rather than cash, discounts), which are often immediate and therefore compliance is attractive. In the examples of social media, whilst there may be unknown or unintended consequences, privacy policies very often can be found embedded within the host site. Moreover, participation and the sharing of personal information or photographs and so on is seen to be voluntary (and possibly less of a threat since it is ‘virtual’), as well it affords social benefits to the subscriber, even if these modes do facilitate exposure and information leaks (Trottier, 2012 (forthcoming)). In entering and/or occupying ‘real’ public spaces, however, one is not likely to know explicitly what information is being captured, or why, and one’s attention is not always drawn to an awareness of being observed and/or watched (even where signs are assumed to notify). Furthermore, the rationale that underpins the use of the CCTV, which is increasingly operational in more and more public spaces, is neither as clear (there are no similarly published protocols), nor are its supposed benefits as obvious or certain, or indeed as direct. CCTV remains something of a mysterious, if ubiquitous, presence and, at least for cynics and critics, perhaps it is actually a divisive one. Its regulation remains mostly vague and its purpose is not always clear, even if CCTV itself is now everywhere and appears under the convincing, if rather loose, auspices of public interest.
 

Indeed, whilst it is commonly held that CCTV is used for policing purposes (be those preventative, pre-emptive, evidential or more generally to lessen the fear of crime), there is a fine line between these versus the unbounded potential for an almost legitimated misuse, particularly given that proper use is not nearly well enough defined. It is almost implicit in that the data to be collected by CCTV and the consequences of that data cannot be anticipated. That is practically the point. Therefore, individuals are regularly, sometimes several times daily, being captured on camera, usually without knowing for what reason(s), if any other than that they happened to be in view. Moreover, they do not necessarily have any awareness of being within a surveilled space, even less appearing on a screen in a control room, and then going predominantly unnoticed anyway or perhaps being looked at or maybe watched, even followed. The lack of automation, unpredictability and irregularity of its application renders CCTV problematic in terms of its regulation. Coupled with the nature of the technology, and that its purpose is to see all irrespective of how the consequences will pan out, further complicates the issue. Is regulation possible? Is best practice enough? What would constitute either of these as policies or practices? Who might guide their development? 

The author of this paper undertook research where case study data was collected during ethnographic fieldwork of in excess of 500 hours carried out in a police CCTV control room in the United Kingdom between 2008 and 2010. She also participated in a surveillance studies Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) funded seminar series ‘The Everyday Life of Surveillance’​[3]​ where reflection on CCTV as a public surveillance medium was presented as of special interest during one meeting held in 2009, particularly the potential for and approach to its regulation. The issues that arose in both practice and theory with a view to policy around the operation of CCTV, especially the function and purpose of it, but most critically its lacking regulation, were very real. But how best to address them? This issue is taken forward in this paper through a discussion of events in relation to a move towards regulation and the process through which this has been and is being undertaken. This is in order to provide a critique of the status quo and a comment on the means by which the way forward appears to have both come about and looks set to be resolved by the same thinking. 









Surveillance, at least as it is characterized in the literature, is perceived by some experts in the field as simply ‘watching people’ (Norris and Armstrong, 1999; Lyon, 2001). In this sense, surveillance is something that everyone can do (without the aid of technology), and does. Furthermore, it is not new: our fascination with ‘watching’ each other is ubiquitous throughout history. Today, it is evident among and not least epitomized by the modern obsession with reality television (Andrejevic, 2003) in a dominant context of celebrity culture. Significantly, however, it is how surveillance is increasingly being carried out, and more formally, that is, or has become, a concern for surveillance theorists/academics (e.g. Surveillance Studies Network (SSN)​[4]​) and the public (e.g. Big Brother Watch​[5]​). This is especially the case where systematic watching is being carried out by organizations through the medium of CCTV, despite there not being sufficient policy to regulate it, or where regulation is not transparent, because it has spilled out of and transcended such containment. This is especially of importance because it is not informal community networks or innocent ‘people-watching’, or indeed media activities, whether gossip or hounding, that are at issue, even where they may be equally unregulated or problematic (such as in the pseudo-surveillance of public life which led to media intrusion of private life as recently investigated by Leveson​[6]​). Rather, the activities being referred to are those which form part of a much more organized, if simultaneously conversely irregular, large network of formal technologically-enhanced, yet altogether subtler, surveillance of everyday living. 






As Newburn and Hayman (2002) discuss, albeit in the context of a custody suite, CCTV facilitates the monitoring of and reaction to (potential) criminal activities, and does so from a remote location. This allows the police (as well as other authorities and private companies who similarly engage in policing) to increase their fields of vision and to simultaneously collect evidence. Such a monitoring technique can contribute enormously to contemporary policing and promises some significant return for relatively little investment. Installation and staffing costs (with developer-bargaining a major input), issues of work and salary, not to mention training, are somewhat different for police personnel compared with numerous cameras operated by minimal ‘support’ staff. Therefore, CCTV proves more efficient than traditional policing provision and techniques. In this vein, it has been suggested that twenty cameras can actually equal twenty police officers (Norris, 2003:254), yet these twenty might only be monitored by one operative. 

CCTV evidence, although not enough in itself, allows official (and other) bodies, for example, to corroborate their claims of crime, to act upon them accordingly, and to visually reproduce an allegedly impartial account of actual events. CCTV is believed to record incidents and detail without prejudice or bias. Effectively, it permits res ipsa loquitur (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Res_ipsa_loquitur" \o "Res ipsa loquitur​): the facts, literally, can speak for themselves. This is not only useful in the context of a courtroom, but also extends to boosting morale for police officers and security staff who can work safe in the knowledge that the best evidence will be available and that an arrest is worth pursuing. It also ensures that counter-claims of unreasonable restraint, assault and so on can be disproved. Indeed, Newburn and Hayman suggest that the ability to record inappropriate restraint or excessive violence on the part of ‘legitimate’ forces also protects the targets of apprehension (2002:125); the arrestees. This is especially important given reports of custody officers’ modifying the ways in which they behave when they are aware that they might be watched or being surveilled. It highlights the need for concern as regards who is watching the ‘watchers’, be they police at one level or CCTV operators at another. Nevertheless, the argument for CCTV is persuasive since it also renders police personnel subject to surveillance (2002:164). CCTV might also assist unwitting victims, where footages were contemporaneously captured, to reveal crucial evidence during playback. Therefore, the prospect of using and the ability to use CCTV as a means of immortalizing facts is arguably desirable and has developed as an important tool for crime processors, particularly as regards decisions to arrest or charge individuals and in the preparation of more watertight cases for court. CCTV is better than the police. As such, a heavy investment of the United Kingdom’s government, police and authorities in these technologies has been observed since their inception (Parker, 2000:66-7). 

Although the argument for deploying CCTV is that it is focused on capturing crimes and their perpetrators, and bringing them to justice in some cases, recent calculations suggest that eighty per cent of CCTV footage is absolutely useless: ‘the camera has to find you’ (Gill and Loveday, 2003:84). Much of the footage recorded is not processed, merely passively (un)observed. Elsewhere, foot patrols report incidents to be recorded, perhaps midway through that incident occurring, or an incident will take place, or move, ‘off camera’. Equally, some are merely recorded, but remain unseen unless they are later reported or the archives are checked. Further, as some people, particularly those who wish to commit acts that they would rather were not ‘caught on camera’, become aware of the camera positions, they are able to employ avoidance tactics and escape the range of camera view, but still commit their crimes. Effectively, CCTV then displaces, as opposed to preventing, criminal activities. 

These latter concerns already limit the possibilities promised by CCTV to the criminal justice system. Moreover, success is restricted to or mediated by those controlling the cameras – the machines cannot operate themselves. In addition, the camera’s full ranges of vision will never be realized at once. Operator error, distraction and even bias can influence what can be and is recorded. Accordingly, there is much debate among the general public concerning data protection, information collection and management. For instance, there is a media-fuelled rumor that an individual might pass on and off camera up to two hundred times per day as they go about their everyday and, in most cases, legitimate business. Indeed, the necessity or advantage of such a probability, as compared with the rate of success in the selection of targets and capture of worthwhile footage, exacerbates CCTV-critical views (e.g. White, 2009; Ashby, 2009). In balance, however, the practical function of CCTV is to deter, displace and so reduce or, failing that, to record crime. The success of CCTV in this regard has been described as ‘sketchy’ (Ashby, 2009). 






Despite the many advantages of using surveillance techniques, especially CCTV, Norris and Armstrong consider that: ‘Surveillance is, after all, a form of power, exercised for the purposes of control and CCTV is only one example of the application of new technologies to extend the surveillance gaze,’ (1999:19). Lyon qualifies this: ‘Human life would be unthinkable without social and personal categorization, yet today surveillance not only rationalizes but automates the process,’ (2003:13). Perhaps the automation to which Lyon refers, however, are surveillance practices such as biometrics (Van de Ploeg, 2003), workplace performance measurement (Ball, 2003) and DNA analysis (Nelkin and Andrews, 2003), rather than CCTV, which cannot be described as automated and where rationality is not inherent. This form of surveillance is not technology dependent in so many ways; it requires human operation, intention and interpretation. Despite the above-mentioned authors’ subtly different conceptualizations of power and its categorization within the context of CCTV, when their understandings are combined, the possibilities (and probabilities) become risky. This is interesting given, as Newburn and Hayman note; ‘the distrust endemic in a ‘risk’ society’ (2002:163), which is compounded and challenged by Giddens’s suggestion that we have moved from ‘localized to abstract systems’: all watch all (as might be found in village life), to some watch some, or all. From both the perspectives of the watcher and the watched, reciprocally, the risk is and fear of ‘the other’, in what could be described as a ‘period of moral panic,’ (Cohen, 2002): simultaneously of growing CCTV/surveillance and criminality, as they are mutually generative. Even though, as Lyon suggests, the process of surveillance is not ‘intrinsically anti-social or repressive’ (2003:31), popular is a view of CCTV whereby the technology is referred to as Orwell’s ‘Big Brother’ (Norris and Armstrong, 1999:10), or as a component of our ‘Big Brother’ state. Often intertwined with this perception is a mocking of the government and official institutions for their incessant collecting and managing of ‘useless’ personal data, which instills trepidation in the populace. Still, Parker claims that seventy two percent of the population does not object to CCTV (2002:65), and Norris and Armstrong cite a (dubious) claim that ninety percent are actually in favor (1999:60). It has also been found, especially following the solving of significant crimes where CCTV has assisted, for example, the brutal murder of James Bulger in Liverpool by two male children, that the general public consensus is that those who object to CCTV are considered ‘callous or too concerned with the rights of criminals,’ (Norris and Armstrong, 1999:37). Therefore, if there is concern, it appears to rest with the (mis)use of the technology rather than its presence. 

Logically, but crucially, an inference of misuse indicates some appreciation for what amounts to legitimate, good use. It also assumes that knowledge of such use is common. In terms of CCTV, this is quite the contrary; what is known are only the cameras that stand tall on poles above the street, and swing left to right every now and then, but not really very noticeably. In fact, it is unlikely that you could tell whether you were being watched, unless paying very careful attention, and, even then, the pan, tilt and zoom functions of the equipment would not allow for you to really know if you were being watched (Norris, 2003:249), although it has been suggested that one to two thirds of the public do (Norris and Armstrong, 1999:92). Regardless, few of us have an idea as to whom, if anyone, at any given point in time, might be watching, and even less their focus; you, the person next to you, or the piece of paper on the ground behind you. Perhaps you won’t even think that there is anyone there – the camera is an impersonal piece of technology, which seems remote; the semi-retired grandfather, who suffers with a bad back and is a little overweight, operator and his mother of four colleague, who can only work during nightshifts as they fit in with her family responsibilities, colleague are not automatically, if ever, associated with the metal machine monsters that prowl (or protect) the community. This was once Goold’s concern and preoccupation in relation to early suggestions of desirable regulation (2002; 2006). Nevertheless, as Koskela suggests: ‘Electronic means are beginning to replace informal social control in urban environments: the eyes of the people on the street are being replaced by the eyes of surveillance cameras’ (2000:244, author’s italics). Furthermore, CCTV use is still growing (Ashby, 2009). This reiterates Giddens’s understandings of modernity: abstraction. Since the eyes are still those of people from the street, however, this is problematic. These people have simply been elevated to the heights of the camera poles and have been equipped with ‘super’-human vision. But they are still human.
 
Of course, surveillance might rest more easily if CCTV cameras were only boxes. And, at that, boxes which were activated by and which objectively select only ‘criminal behavior’ for the purpose of gathering evidence in order that the police can pursue a case against the perpetrator and bring them to justice. The problems, then, would be purely technological. Technical failure or error; limitations of range through camera position, or post-installation building developments which mar the views, adverse weather conditions or sun, dirt, etc.; perhaps these might be accepted as ‘occupational hazards’. Less interpretative and more objective CCTV practices would surely be desirable? Impossible; the boxes are not only affected by irritating and restrictive, but blameless and disembodied, technological failures as above, but also by the operator. A question of concern about the individuals who do such work must be posed, especially where those people who are employed as operators are susceptible to long hours of monitoring CCTV. There are issues of comfort and boredom, as McCahill found (2002), which Loveday and Gill (2003) suggest affects operator concentration. Furthermore, the operator is an individual (albeit, as Paterson (2007) charges, one who is monitoring multiple cameras and therefore already delimited in terms of their viewing capacity) with bias, beliefs and idiosyncrasies in the choices and determinations s/he makes. That is determination in the sense that the person controlling each camera is effectively determining the records that are made and, as such, made relevant. Therefore, public right to concern should question such subjectivity. Media hype surrounding official policy and control, in fact, might have been effectively displaced: imagination and reality are somewhat misinformed since CCTV distils further to the individual (and social) level, as opposed to remaining at the institutional, permitting and requiring of people at operator-level to become experts in social patterns, economics, sociology and psychology (Smith, 2007). Those working in CCTV are therefore ‘licensed’ moral entrepreneurs and make (informed) decisions. What ‘information’ are these based upon? Might the personal be political and how biased or targeted is the watching as a consequence? 

There are ‘knowns’, who are usually from the poorest areas of a town and have alcohol and/or substance and/or mental health problems, whom McCahill notes ‘are subject to intensive and intrusive monitoring,’ (2002:120) and often feature in what he describes as a ‘Rogue’s Gallery’ – an album of stills and personal information kept in police (and other) control rooms as used for identification and PNC (Police National Computer) checking (McCahill, 2002). Although, the ‘who’ is watching, as Smith (2004) argues; mainly men, and ‘who’ is watched has been discussed, at length, within many surveillance texts to date (Norris and Armstrong, 1999; McCahill, 2002; Smith, 2004), there are many ‘stars’ (Smith, 2007) and many stories, most of these remaining ‘unknown’. Indeed, it is the relationship between those who subject and are the subject of CCTV surveillance with which this paper ultimately becomes concerned, specifically the regulation of that and those interactions, and especially the ethics surrounding subjectivity and transparency given the absence of a definite policy. Moreover, it is the identification of that gap, the potential for it to be filled and the means by which it might be realized which underpins this critique.


A ‘surveillance policy’ for CCTV? 

Critical approaches to problematizing surveillance work and theorizing what is done, and is possible, among what are effectively unregulated surveillance-mediated inter-personal relationships are not new. ‘Surveillance studies’ is now a well-established field (e.g. the aforementioned SSN) and one which continues to thrive. Indeed, the first dedicated surveillance research centre in Europe, ‘CRISP’ (the Centre for Research into Information, Surveillance and Privacy​[10]​), was recently opened at the University of Stirling. Inter-disciplinary researchers at CRISP (from social sciences, arts, humanities, information science and other relevant backgrounds) will study surveillance technologies, how they are used to gather information about daily activities and their privacy implications. CRISP will represent a beacon and a hub for the existing community of surveillance scholars, and the body of their work (e.g. SSN), as well it will encourage new and innovative streams of research and academic enquiry into surveillance. Meanwhile, the SSN community continues to actively engage with the proliferation of surveillance mechanisms and the lack of effective policies in particular, as it has always done, especially in examples such as CCTV where there is alarming scope for abuse (discussed further below in respect of the aforementioned seminar). 
The promotion and facilitation of networking and knowledge exchange between practitioners, academics, students, activists and society more generally are key to achieving mutual appreciation of the difficulties around theoretical problems and their practical remedy. Indeed, this has been highlighted as one of the key aims of CRISP among an evolving paradigm of contemporary academic research that should have impact. In order that a more joined up and effective approach to resolving the issues that are identified or arise might be undertaken, active enablement of collaboration is important. Technologies like CCTV have literally overtaken, and continue to, what the law and policy makers and practitioners, as well as academics, could and can keep up with and the pace of technological developments points to a continued need for vigilance and ongoing dialogue. It is therefore important that all personnel concerned with this particular field regularly share knowledge and resources and work together to determine appropriate, practicable and timely solutions where these are possible. 

It seems that this approach is largely driven by academics, however, and as such those who critique the use of surveillant technologies, or at least the lack of regulation and policy outside of which they advance, and err towards a professional cynicism. Nevertheless, issues have not gone unrecognized by proponents of the technologies in practice, where good practice should be implicit anyway, and this was true of the CCTV managers (four from two Forces in the United Kingdom) that the author spoke to in the course of her research. Those concerned were not only actively working to address the regulation gap, but were also well aware that the signage which often accompanies their systems generate the odd telephone call/query from a member of the public to which they need to be ready to respond. Accordingly, and because individuality affects the not so automated process, individual, practitioner-led CCTV policies have begun to appear and to be introduced independently across many CCTV outfits as they professionalize. Practice statements are now being published as is more generally evident from a number of Forces’ websites. Many of these policies have been rewritten (or have been newly created where previously absent) more recently in order to explicitly incorporate the protection of equality since the consolidation of diversity safeguard was prioritized in institutional policy agendas and indeed has become enshrined in national law (e.g. Equality Act 2010 in the United Kingdom). Policies normally cover age, race, ethnicity, gender, class, ability and other socio-categories. They are not, however, necessarily comprehensive in relation to application in actual practice: what these categories mean and how they are treated. How are subjects (or objects) of surveillance watched according to and appropriately for their given characteristics, particularly when Lyon suggests that: ‘Deep discrimination occurs … making surveillance not a matter of personal privacy but of social justice,’ (2003:1)? Moreover, what is not taken into account is how a policy can be appropriately informed and developed, especially where these have been designed haphazardly, individually, autonomously and generally free of academic input, usually at an operational level and within a policing culture.

Owing to this discussion, these possibilities, and the concerns that arise from them, particularly in relation to regulating a surveillance technology such as CCTV, the question of having a policy that is comprehensive and effective, and does not merely pay lip service to a perceived need to have one, to tick a box, is apt to be raised. Of course, surveillance is much broader than just CCTV, and the more mechanised, rationalised forms of surveillance vary in practical and procedural terms.​[11]​ It may even be that for those using the technologies it feels as though adequate measures are already in place as impropriety is rare, especially if they perceive CCTV to be one of those they consider to be automated. In the author’s experience, CCTV managers and operators do not consider CCTV or the way in which they use it to be in any way oppressive. However, it does seem that a call for a policy (and equipment) ‘stock take’, inventory and overhaul is overdue if for no other reason than that is not one agreed code and that this deficiency has variously been identified, interpreted and responded to by both practitioners and other interested parties. A key issue remains, however, and that is what a universally-applicable policy would contain and how it could guarantee effectiveness given the nature of CCTV and its various uses. 

Moreover, it is not just what is possible for CCTV in terms of a policy’s content, but who contributes to and leads its development and consolidation, and from what angle(s) the necessary tasks should be problematized, prioritized and addressed. As discussed above, the notion of a wider code of practice or policy has been deliberated among surveillance scholars, not just in relation to CCTV, but in terms of good practice across all surveillance. Not only has the conversation been had in the Academy, especially among SSN members and in the contexts to be discussed below, but the media and politicians have also responded to the rise of the surveillance society, again discussed below. As has also been acknowledged in this paper is that practitioners themselves are engaging too. Nevertheless, this is still all rather disjointed, although the need for a common conversation to be had has been highlighted. The driving forward where policy is concerned, however, is largely being pushed by academics, since they appear to be the group thinking behind the ‘problem’s’ creation and it is this which, I argue, needs to be looked at more carefully. 


A policy by, for and led by whom?

Given that surveillance is so broad, and that the implications of a policy would be considerable at both bureaucratic and ‘ground’ levels, it must be considered how a universal policy would be developed and by whom? Work has been, or is being, undertaken on this issue in European research projects. These are linked under two ‘headings’:

	Urbaneye – On the Threshold to Urban Panopticon?​[12]​
	COST – Living in Surveillance Societies (LiSS)​[13]​

Together, these academic-led projects have developed evaluations of CCTV (the former) and CCTV among wider surveillance practices (the latter) and both consider legal and regulatory frameworks, political discussion, public thought, and, essentially, policy recommendations.​[14]​ For Urbaneye, the conclusions were such that:

	policy is deemed an issue, because, although CCTV has been around for forty years, since the 1990s it has been used by police and local authorities and only latterly has it become subject to Data Protection​[15]​ and Human Rights​[16]​ legislation;
	legal regulations vary (institutional and national contexts);
	the regulations that are common can be contradictory and confusing in terms of the possibilities for their interpretation, e.g. Article 8​[17]​.

From these conclusions, it can be suggested that the absence of specific regulation and a universal policy that clearly codifies CCTV’s regulation is significant.

Crucially, this project (Urbaneye), and its successor (COST/LiSS), raised the question of such a CCTV (surveillance) code of practice. Further, and perhaps as a response to academic activity, in April 2009, Viviane Reding​[18]​ of the European Parliament began lobbying for ‘privacy in a digital age’.​[19]​ Therefore, the issue was identified on the European political agenda. Nevertheless, there have been no significant developments and the status quo is such that remain essentially ‘policy-less-ness’. In the interim, however, the House of Lords has recently referred to, commissioned,​[20]​ leading United Kingdom academics to inform the Select Committee (Constitution) on ‘Surveillance: Citizens and the State’, the focus of the above-mentioned seminar presentation and the title of their report, undertaken in order to act as a lever to prompt the United Kingdom government into its own early action/response.​[21]​ This is where the main concern of my paper becomes crucial: I question that the ‘monopoly’ of United Kingdom academics – those who are, presumably, using the same kind of thinking to solve problems as they did to create them – on a House of Lords policy is questionable: their distinctly academic approach is not representative of all the activities being engaged in and does not draw nearly enough on the valuable contributions of the practitioners who would ultimately need to implement it. Although the Select Committee has consulted numerous authorities and institutions around the world, it seemed, or was at least presented at the afore-mentioned seminar as such, that there was a heavy reliance on academic input both substantively and as the mediator through which other contributions might be understood. The list of witnesses is varied, of course, and the report demonstrates that all involvement would be considered per a fair inquiry, however, there is essentially the effect that the questions which have been problematized by academics are those being used in order to inform policy development. It is top-down rather than bottom-up. Of course, this is not unusual, but at a pragmatic level, should be the concern of everyday practitioners. Although the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) were involved, again, this is top-down since they are arguably quite far removed from the actual practices that CCTV operators are engaging in and with which this paper is ultimately concerned, operators, in effect, being represented back to the House of Lords through academic and management perspectives. The approach appears to undermine the value of any thorough and meaningful involvement of actual practitioners, especially those on ‘the front line’, in direct consultation (even if the academic research on which academics might base their opinions will have drawn variously on micro-level practitioner views and perspectives, as well will those of their management structure). 






In spite of the concerns, or observations, detailed above, the notion of ‘towards (a) policy’ is nevertheless progressing. The House of Lords Select Committee has endeavoured to follow a distinctively constitutional approach to surveillance: not a lesser investigation under the remit of Home Affairs, Justice or for the Joint Committee Human Rights. In thinking about regulation and misuse, governance and accountability, however, and despite my reservations hitherto, the key mission has been to instigate policy and regulate proactively, where, to date, regulation has been reactive, based on codes of practice (managerial), with a focus on the person/individual (per ECHR Article 8), rather than ‘public interest’ and outside of public debate (i.e. in the Academy). Among a constantly updated plethora of media horror stories, the burden of regulation has become a priority. Indeed, key recommendations listed in the report were: 

	to instigate legal devices for controlling systems and practices and techniques that have a regulatory effect;
	to institute compulsory risk assessments;
	to expand the role of commissioners (information);
	to ensure that regulators have more power and resources.

In terms of moving away from the Academy’s arguably crucial role in the process, this does not seem to go any further forward in terms of effective representativeness in the development of policy, although the suggestions are accessible to and apparently practicable for practitioners. Additionally, these are recommendations that could be applied at many levels, and so would be appropriate across differing European set-ups. As earlier considered: perhaps the idea of a policy is useful after all? Yet, in terms of the notion of criminological tools, social control, and also the notions of power, and particularly as conceptualised sociologically, the gist of the recommended policy does not deal directly with academic surveillance issues: Bentham’s (2003 [-] ‘panopticon’; Foucault’s (1991 [c.1975]) carceral continuum; Giddens’s (2009) agency and structure, modernity; or Bauman’s (1991) ‘stranger’. Moreover, it does not deal specifically with the types of ‘human’ questions that sociologists and criminologists posit in interrogating social behaviour. The recommendations are not aimed at these academic areas of interest and work. Instead, they appear to be practice-focused. At that, they are still bureaucratic, which is perhaps as a result of academics’ and managers’ assumptions about what surveillance work, CCTV work, actually entails, but is that not a, the, problem?

Furthermore, and perhaps linked, what concerns the author is that, despite the perhaps broader applications of these proposed policies, which will not be the immediate concern of those informing it (academics will still revert to academia and managers to management), these ‘informants’ also have biases and prejudices, especially towards surveillance, which essentially underpins their approaches to it (academics against and managers for). In particular, the Academy is not only informing policy, but being instrumental in creating it, despite the broad presence of a cynical attitude towards or lack of sympathy for CCTV’s (and perhaps wider surveillance media too) uses. Furthermore, there appears to be a fundamental self-contradiction in feelings there. For instance, on the one hand, Benjamin Goold,​[24]​ a keynote speaker at the above-mentioned seminar, an academic whose works have been cited in the background to this paper, and a delegate of the SSN to the Select Committee, conceptualised CCTV activities around ‘Nothing Town’ at the seminar which ensued post-inquiry. He suggested, albeit ‘off the cuff’, that public (police) surveillance, CCTV, controllers should invite members of the public into their units because this would allow them to experience CCTV as an operator does, as the police or local authority do. They would then understand that CCTV is a desirable exercise in governance, which benefits the law-abiding public in terms of reducing tangible victimisation or providing evidence of it, and in lessening the fear of crime. Essentially, the idea would be to convince the indifferent, the critics, and cynics, that public surveillance is not a tool for social control and, further, that operators are not mere voyeurs: that there are actual, tangible benefits to be enjoyed when police surveillance is operational. He continued (quoted from my notes): ‘perhaps they could have open sessions on, say, a Wednesday morning, 0900 – 1130, when nothing much is going on in Nothing Town.’ 

On the other hand, what came out of the inquiry, and what Goold himself advocated at the seminar attended by the author, were the House of Lords’s eventual recommendations as presented in their report to the United Kingdom government:

	disappointment in the Government’s reaction to the ‘danger’ posed by surveillance and their failure to approve and implement policy recommendations;
	disappointment that the Government did not accept that a legislative approach in regard to amending the Data Protection Act 1998 would be beneficial;
	essentially, that the Government’s response does not recognise how PIA (Privacy Impact Assessment) implementation is designed to work;
	specifically for CCTV (No.20., p.6): 
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